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Abstract 
Since the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, civil society across Europe has participated in an 
unprecedented wave of support towards migrants. This article focuses on the volunteers 
engaged in this movement and explores how they relate emotions of compassion and 
evaluations about the ‘deservingness’ of refugees. We do so by analysing the moral dilemmas 
British volunteers face in their interaction with refugees, and the strategies they develop to 
avoid the difficulties that emerge when judging who the ‘deserving’ refugees are. We 
illustrate how these coping strategies lead them to emphasise the practicality of their role 
and to move beyond logics of deservingness. We argue that these dilemmatic situations 
reshape the meaning of compassionate acts in ambivalent ways: while reinforcing a tendency 
to create an emotional distance, they also allow volunteers to challenge idealised 
representations of refugees and foreground the political nature of their vulnerability.  
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Introduction  
Since the ‘long summer of migration’ in 2015, individuals and charities across Europe have 
participated in an unprecedented wave of support towards refugees.1 In particular, the 
picture of Alan Kurdi, the Syrian boy who died attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea in 
September 2015, laid bare the lack of compassion and care in government policies 
(Armbruster, 2019). As a reaction, individuals and charities started engaging in a broad and 
diverse volunteer-based movement epitomised by highly visible campaigns such as Refugees 
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Welcome and the Twitter hashtag #CompassionCrisis. This response material- ised into 
initiatives such as organised hosting networks, language courses, food and clothes donations, 
legal assistance or rescue missions at the European borders.  
This article aims to explore this ‘compassionate’ response from the perspective of the 
volunteers engaged in these activities, looking specifically at how these actors construct and 
negotiate ideas about the ‘deservingness’ of refugees. Through the focus on how volunteers 
represent refugees as ‘deserving’ of their help, we aim to analyse how charity actors define 
and justify their engagement, and the moral values and emotions underpin- ning it. Also, 
more generally in a context in which an increasingly large proportion of refugees are left to 
rely on non-governmental and third sector organisations (APPG, 2017; Mayblin and James, 
2019), we aim to gain a deeper understanding of this growing form of non-state welfare and 
of the services that shape migrants’ lives and opportunities (Feischmidt et al., 2019).  
We pay particular attention to how volunteers deal with moral and emotional dilem- mas 
around who deserves their support, which emerge when the perceived boundaries between 
representations of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ refugees become blurred (see Eliasoph 
(2016) and Theodossopoulos (2016) for a similar focus on the dilemmas of volunteers and 
activists). As shown by Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas (2014), the notion of ‘deservingness’ 
is useful as it allows us to explore how migrants’ strategies intersect with state definitions of 
legal categories and how different agents (e.g. charities, street-level bureaucrats) define and 
implement processes of distinction between groups of migrants (Dhaliwal and Forkert, 2015; 
Menjívar and Lakhani, 2016; Monforte et al., 2019; Shiff, 2020; Tonkiss, 2018). However, only 
a few studies have explored this idea from the point of view of the individual actors who 
engage in volunteering.2 Also, notions of compassion and humanitarianism have been largely 
investigated in relation to govern- ing discourses and policies (Fassin, 2010; Sirriyeh, 2018; 
Ticktin, 2017) as well as char- ity or non-governmental organisation (NGO) discourses 
(Armbruster, 2019; Fassin and d’Halluin, 2005; Hyndman, 2000; Redfield, 2013). 
Nevertheless, they have remained relatively under-explored at the scale of personal 
engagement and practices (see Harrison, 2013), which instead constitute the subject of this 
article. As we will develop below, this focus is important because it shows how deservingness 
is endorsed, negotiated and sometimes subverted by those who directly construct and 
implement collective actions in support of refugees.  
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Our general argument is that established notions of deservingness are destabilised in the 
process of volunteering, hence shifting the meanings of compassion. We observed that the 
boundaries between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ refugees become questioned especially 
when the roles and activities of volunteers and refugees are not clearly defined and in spaces 
in which these two groups experience the effects of state bordering pro- cesses. In these 
situations, volunteers are faced with moral and emotional dilemmas related to how lines are 
being drawn between who is included or excluded, accepted or not, deserving of their 
compassion or undeserving. We show that participants develop specific mechanisms to cope 
with these dilemmas: they focus on the execution of practical tasks and they avoid making 
judgements about the deservingness of refugees. We argue that this leads them to negotiate 
the meaning given to their activities and re- evaluate compassion in seemingly divergent 
ways: on the one hand, they reinforce a tendency to create an emotional distance between 
themselves and the refugees but, on the other, they also potentially counter dominant 
discourses around compassion, in par- ticular by challenging the very notion that their 
compassionate engagement should fol- low a logic of deservingness. More generally this 
article shows that, far from being stable over time, the moral values and emotions that 
underpin acts of compassion are constantly re-evaluated and re-interpreted throughout the 
experience in the field.  
In the first section of the article, we link the literature on compassion and deserving- ness 
with that on the forms of refugee support that emerged after 2015. We then present the 
context of the empirical research and the methods that we used. Turning to our empir- ical 
findings, we illustrate how participants define different figures of ‘deserving’ refu- gees. In 
the two final sections, we explore the tensions around these representations during the 
experience of volunteering, which can lead to questioning notions of deserv- ingness. We 
then analyse three coping mechanisms that our respondents articulate in order to overcome 
these dilemmas: shifting the responsibility to make judgement to external agencies; actively 
avoiding situations in which they should produce a judge- ment; portraying the situation of 
the refugees as too complex to make a judgement. Finally, we discuss the consequences of 
these processes, stressing the ambivalence of volunteers’ engagement.  
 
Compassion, Deservingness and Refugee Support Volunteering  
 4 
The vast movement of refugee support that has emerged across Europe as a result of the 
2015 ‘refugee crisis’ has been the subject of growing scholarly attention (Agustín and Bak 
Jorgensen, 2019; Armbruster, 2019; Della Porta, 2018; Feischmidt et al., 2019; Fontanari and 
Borri, 2017; Youkhana and Sutter, 2017). The literature has focused on the emergence and 
nature of this volunteer-based movement (De Jong and Ataç, 2017; Sandri, 2018; Zamponi, 
2017), its relationship to political action (Fleischmann and Steinhilper, 2017; Vandevoordt and 
Verschraegen, 2019) and the role of emotions in mobilising participants (Armbruster, 2019; 
Doidge and Sandri, 2018; Karakayali, 2017; Sirriyeh, 2018). In particular, these studies show 
how compassion is a central emotion that motivates a variety of actors to participate in the 
movement, as well as how this emo- tion shapes the nature of civil society response to the 
‘refugee crisis’ (Armbruster, 2019; Kleres, 2018; Sirriyeh, 2018). Indeed, as Sirriyeh (2018: 4) 
argues, this movement was characterised by ‘an outpouring of expressions of compassion’. 
Compassion can be gen- erally defined as a benevolent disposition, which is fundamentally 
other-regarding – as the Latin etymology of the word, ‘suffering with’, indicates (Williams, 
2008). During the ‘refugee crisis’, charities and networks appealed to the compassion of 
citizens by asking them, as the name of certain organisations and campaigns evoke, to 
‘Choose Love’ or to ‘Care for Calais’. As shown by Sirriyeh (2018), these compassionate 
responses were also triggered by media and political discourses that invoked the generosity 
of citizens. Following Hochschild (2012 [1983]), Kleres (2018) argues that compassion can be 
regarded as a feeling rule in this sector, indicating how people should feel, as well as how they 
adapt to these rules, through emotion management.  
The analysis of compassion as a ‘feeling rule’ in the Refugee Welcome movement resonates 
with the broader literature on volunteering and humanitarian action. This lit- erature shows 
that emotions, such as compassion, are often strategically mobilised and built by NGOs and 
charities to optimise the recruitment, sustain the involvement and guide the actions of 
participants (Bornstein and Redfield, 2011; Fassin, 2010; Ticktin, 2017). Nevertheless, 
foregrounding the role of emotions in the refugee support sector should not lead us to 
overlook how it operates in practice at the individual level and within specific contexts 
(Whitebrook, 2002). As an ‘emotion in operation’ (Berlant, 2004: 4), compassion is indeed 
deeply connected to action, ‘containing a directive to action to alleviate the suffering’ 
(Sirriyeh, 2018: 10; see also Boltanski, 1993). Moreover, it is important to note that 
 5 
compassion is also intrinsically an ambiguous ‘feeling rule’ that can refer to a diverse range of 
emotions, from pity to solidarity (Sirriyeh, 2018; Theodossopoulos, 2016). The former is based 
on the objectification of the sufferer by someone who is not suffering, while the latter 
indicates co-suffering between equals (Hoggett, 2006; Kleres, 2018). We therefore need to 
analyse how this prominent ‘feeling rule’ is shaped and re-interpreted in and through the day-
to-day actions of the volunteers, beyond the articulation of this emotion in policy and charity 
discourses.  
More generally, it is important to stress that compassion, as an emotion that guides social 
relations, relates to specific moral evaluation processes about the suffering and 
deservingness of those who are perceived as in need of support (Nussbaum, 1996; Sznaider, 
1998; Williams, 2008). As Nussbaum (1996: 28) suggests, far from being an ‘irrational force in 
human affairs’, compassion (or pity, which she uses to refer to the same emotion (1996: 29)) 
is based on three evaluative principles: (a) the acknowledge- ment of the other’s suffering as 
serious; (b) the belief in the innocence of the sufferer – in the sense that they did not 
intentionally produce their own suffering; and (c) the per- ceived similarity between the 
helper and the sufferer. This view has been criticised for being idealistic and not capturing the 
way compassion works in real life. Whitebrook (2002), for instance, observes that it is virtually 
impossible to express a definite judge- ment about the innocence of the sufferers or to 
completely identify with them. Nevertheless, Nussbaum’s critics still emphasise the centrality 
of evaluation processes, and in particular of the judgement about the ‘deservingness’ of 
people in need of com- passion. For example, Berlant (2004) argues that compassion is based 
on a judgement by the ‘spectator’: ‘since some pain is more compelling than other pain, we 
must make judgements about which cases deserve attention’ (2004: 11).  
Drawing on these ideas, we want to explore how judgements and evaluation processes about 
the ‘deservingness’ of refugees are constructed and negotiated by volunteers through their 
experience ‘in the field’. We will show that, while volunteers often tend to endorse and 
reproduce charity, governmental and media discourses around deservingness, pro- refugee 
volunteering is often characterised by tensions and dilemmas. For example, they might 
experience emotional difficulties when dealing with the traumatic pasts and the suffering of 
migrants (Doidge and Sandri, 2018) or when witnessing behaviours they might disapprove of 
(Malkki, 2015; Willemez, 2002). In other cases, volunteers might also become uncomfortable 
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with the increasingly disciplinary attitudes of certain NGOs (Armbruster, 2019). Focusing on 
dilemmas, we aim to explore the ground for the re- negotiation of established notions of 
deservingness. Through coping strategies that often characterise the emotional work of 
charity workers and volunteers when faced with moral and emotional ‘impasses’ (see Malkki, 
2015; Roth, 2015), we maintain that the meaning itself of compassion also changes in the 
process of supporting the refugees. We will show in particular how moral and emotional 
dilemmas lead volunteers to re-evaluate two pre- dominant discourses that have strongly 
shaped notions of deservingness during the ‘refu- gee crisis’. The first relates to the 
governance of immigration and asylum issues through ‘humanitarian reason’ (Fassin, 2010; 
Ticktin, 2017), whereby the main criteria for the judgement of who can be granted a refugee 
status is vulnerability and suffering (Fassin and d’Halluin, 2005). The second centres around 
the neoliberal image of the ‘responsible’ and ‘proactive’ subject (Brown, 2003; Monforte et 
al., 2019). Within this form of govern- ment, deserving migrants are constructed as productive 
individuals who are keen to dem- onstrate their civic and economic integration into the ‘host 
society’.  
We show that these representations are especially challenged by volunteers who engage in 
three types of activities: those who host refugees; those who do visits in immi- gration 
detention and removal centres; and those who volunteer in Calais and Dunkirk. We suggest 
that this is due to two main aspects. First, these three forms of volunteering are characterised 
by higher uncertainty compared to other forms of engagement that occur in more definite 
and regulated settings, like that of a charity office. In these situa- tions, volunteers are faced 
with multiple and different needs of refugees. As a result, they often have to negotiate the 
boundaries of their roles and carefully manage the expecta- tions of the beneficiaries. Second, 
the spaces where these three forms of volunteering take place are characterised by intense 
bordering processes (in the sense of social order- ing and border-making practices, see Yuval-
Davis et al., 2017) that produce lines between who is included and who is excluded in the 
everyday life (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2012; Yuval-Davis et al., 2017). Arguably, these 
bordering processes occur at different scales, including the physical frontier in Calais and the 
immigration removal centre but also the more intimate spaces of the home, where moral 
lines of inclusion and exclusion run through (Askins, 2014; Humphris, 2019).  
Researching Compassion: Context and Methods  
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The analysis in this article draws on a comparative research that explores how volunteers 
based in the UK and France frame their commitment to the support of refugees. We draw on 
72 in-depth interviews with volunteers involved in different British charities and net- works 
active for the support of refugees. The interviews took place between May 2017 and 
November 2018 in London, Birmingham, Sheffield and the Midlands, and were con- ducted 
in a variety of local, national and transnational organisations. Some of these were active 
before the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ and were recognised as established actors in the field, such 
as charities specialised in humanitarian aid, legal advice and those facilitating visits in 
detention centres. Others (e.g. those for hosting refugees and groups active in Calais) 
emerged more recently and operate at a more informal level. The participants in our sample 
dedicate themselves to different types of activities, including: legal advice; emotional and 
therapeutic support; donations of food and clothes in the Calais ‘jungle’; hosting; and English 
language courses. Our sample comprises volunteers of different age, gender and socio-
economic backgrounds. However, it should be noted that a large part of our participants are 
women and retired people (55 women and 28 retired). Also, in terms of ethnic and socio-
economic background, most of our participants presented themselves as white and ‘middle 
class’ in the interviews. Charity representatives confirmed that these profiles are over-
represented among volunteers engaged in this field. Finally, the vast majority of our 
participants started volunteering in the refugee support sector during or after the 2015 
‘refugee crisis’, while only 19 participants started before 2015.  
The participants were approached through gatekeepers (often charity representatives) or 
directly (in the case of informal networks) and through a snowball strategy. Our engagement, 
either through previous academic research or individual volunteering in charities supporting 
refugees or disadvantaged minorities in the UK and abroad, allowed us to quickly gain trust 
among representatives and volunteers. And, while we did not engage directly in the 
volunteering activities of the associations in the course of our empirical fieldwork, we 
observed some of the activities of the charities (for example drop-in sessions for legal and 
welfare advice), and we engaged in informal discussions with volunteers when possible. Our 
position between ‘insiders’ (i.e. expert and engaged in the refugee support sector) and 
‘outsiders’ (i.e. not involved in the associations included in the research) enabled us to relate 
to the experiences of the participants while not making them feel judged when discussing 
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about their moral dilemmas and the diffi- culties of their daily activities. To facilitate this 
discussion, our interviews included questions about, for example, the volunteers’ personal 
trajectories, their relationship with refugees, their general experience of volunteering, 
including the dilemmas that they face and the values that motivate their engagement. The 
data collected were coded and ana- lysed with NVivo, through which we identified the 
different representations of the refu- gees (positive and negative), the various reasons to act, 
the values and emotions shaping the experience of volunteering, as well as the potential 
transformations in the engage- ment of the participants. The representations of deserving 
refugees that we analyse in the next section – and the dilemmas and coping strategies they 
lead to – were identified inductively, focusing in particular on responses to questions related 
to the volunteers’ personal difficulties and the description of concrete situations in which they 
critically reflected about their own engagement.  
 
‘Is Her Need Great Enough?’: Deservingness, Moral Dilemmas and Emotional Unease in 
Volunteering with Refugees  
During the interviews, we observed that volunteers developed three main representations of 
refugees that tend to reinforce governmental divisions between the desirable (and therefore 
deserving of compassion) and the undesirable ones (undeserving). The first representation 
aligns with humanitarianism and stresses suffering and helplessness as opposed to the idea 
of the refugee as a potentially threatening subject, represented by the figure of the invader 
or potential terrorist (Grohman et al., 2017; Rettberg and Gajjala, 2016). For instance, when 
asked to discuss whether she made a distinction between helping refugees and British 
homeless people, a volunteer from a London-based hosting network argued that refugees are 
‘more vulnerable’: ‘I know many homeless people have very little recourse to anybody else. 
But [refugees] specifically have less recourse to the other actors in the field, such as homeless 
charities. I think they are more vulnerable’ (Interview 3, woman, 58 years old). As this example 
shows, vulnerability is perceived as ‘situational’ (Armbruster, 2019: 2686) and can be 
produced by different circumstances at different moments of the lives of the refugees. From 
this perspective, the Home Office is frequently considered as the major source of refugee 
suffering once in the UK, both because of the uncertainty of the asylum process and because 
of the lack of support after getting the refugee status.  
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The second figure is that of the resilient agent, who withstood dreadful situations. This is for 
example illustrated by a volunteer in Sheffield, who insisted on the resilience of refugees, 
despite the challenges they face: ‘I’ve never ever heard one person moan, ever. No moaning, 
and the stoicism, and the courage, the resilience is phenomenal. It’s humbling to witness it’ 
(Interview 15, woman, 62 years old). Bravery is also often acknowledged as characterising the 
refugees, as a London-based volunteer highlighted:  
If your house was burnt down, if you were in prison unjustly without trial [. . .] what 
would you be doing? [. . .] I know one thing, I don’t have half the courage of what the 
people I’ve got the privilege to help had to do. (Interview 9, woman, 70 years old)  
In contrast with the image of the vulnerable refugee, in this case the difficulties are not used 
to depict refugees as victims but to show their remarkable determination and strength. Thus, 
the figure of the ‘resilient refugee’ starts from the same premises of vul- nerability but 
stresses agency and exceptional courage rather than portraying refugees as victims.  
The third articulation of deservingness that emerges from our interviews manifests even 
further the idea of neoliberal subjectivity and agency. It represents the ‘entrepre- neurial 
refugee’, who counters the idea of the ‘scrounger’ or bogus asylum seeker (Banks, 2012). This 
was clearly stated by a London-based volunteer of a national charity: ‘They [the refugees] 
really want to assimilate and contribute to society and get on with their lives really [. . .], they 
don’t want to be a burden on society any more than anybody else’ (Interview 27, man, 69 
years old). From the same perspective, another host stressed how pleased she was when her 
guest became a ‘British tax payer’ (Interview 1, woman, 61 years old, London). Within this 
type of deservingness, the refugees are seen as proactive and productive subjects that should 
be enabled to express their full potential as economic agents and the more general 
contribution they can make to society.  
These illustrations of how participants talk about those they aim to support show that the 
portrayals of refugees as vulnerable, resilient and entrepreneurial counter various negative 
views, such as that of the ‘invader’, the ‘bogus’ refugee or the ‘scrounger’. The more positive 
images that participants put forward in their narratives resonate with a compassionate 
framework (close to pity) characterised by an objectification and ideali- sation of the 
sufferers, defined as ‘pure’ and ‘innocent’ (Hoggett, 2006; Sirriyeh, 2018; Ticktin, 2017). Our 
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analysis, however, shows that these idealised representations and distinctions are questioned 
in the experience of volunteering. 
Volunteers’ dilemmas can be produced by questions emerging around the morals of the 
refugees they support. For instance, when asked about the challenges she faced when 
volunteering in detention centres, a London-based participant originally from Israel 
mentioned the case of a detainee who had a ‘threatening’ behaviour: ‘The other thing has 
been working with . . . one person who was . . . unbelievably angry, threatening [. . .] not to 
me personally but came out with things that were really really (sic) worrying, aggressive, 
hugely anti-Israel’ (Interview 44, woman, 71 years old). A similar tension was experienced by 
a volunteer who went to a camp in Dunkirk with a local group from the Midlands, and who 
underlined her feeling of ‘confusion’ and disappointment with a woman who pretended to 
be a victim of human trafficking: ‘It turned out to be a com- plete lie, complete lie’ (Interview 
36, woman, 57 years old), she reiterated in the inter- view. These dilemmas are even stronger 
when volunteers interact with highly stigmatised figures, especially criminal offenders in 
detention or smugglers in the camps. A volun- teer from the Midlands argued that the 
presence of ‘bad people’ was one of the most challenging aspects of volunteering:  
We’re quite aware that if we go into the camp, well not that there’s many camps now 
in Northern France, but when we go into camps that there are the bad people there. 
There are people smugglers there. There are possibly maybe Taliban. Like you don’t 
know. (Interview 57, woman, 38 years old)  
In other cases, volunteers can also question the suffering of the people they support. For 
example, a host told us how she started asking herself whether her guest genuinely needed 
help or made a ‘calculated decision’ to access a service:  
The thing I feel is challenging to myself is, is her need great enough? Like, because she 
has friends, she has family here, and she is gonna go into social services, and again, I 
don’t know, is that a calculated decision that she’s made? (Interview 32, woman, 32 
years old, Birmingham)  
Similarly, other volunteers mentioned the difficulty to engage in supporting refugees who are 
not as isolated or vulnerable as they initially thought. For instance, speaking of her guest, 
another host remarked how she had hoped they would spend more time together while ‘he 
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prefers to feed himself’ and to spend time with his friends outside the house (Interview 13, 
woman, 78 years old, London). In contrast with the frustration of trying to help someone who 
appears less vulnerable than expected, others com- plained about the perceived lack of 
agency of their guest. For instance, a volunteer described one of her guests as ‘too troubled’ 
and complaining (Interview 12, woman, 52 years old, London). Similarly, a London-based host 
described his guest through the stereotype of the ‘immigrant sponger’ (a representation that, 
however, he dissociated himself from):  
[GUEST NAME] said he would bring his family here and he thought the council would 
give him a flat. No, I said, it’s not that simple, they might not give you a flat. This is like 
the Daily Mail idea of immigrants spongers. He worked in a car factory. I said you should 
get an Arab- English dictionary. . . how didn’t he buy one? So I phoned up the Arabic 
shop and gave him the address to go and get it, but he didn’t. (Interview 14, man, 88 
years old)  
As these examples illustrate, volunteers are often faced with ambiguous situations in which 
the person they are helping suddenly appears to them as not fully deserving their support, 
confirming negative stereotypes such as the ‘sponger’ or ‘Taliban’. In the most extreme cases, 
these dilemmas have led to periods of burnout, as several volunteers in Calais and Dunkirk 
reported.  
The interviews we conducted have confirmed the troubling nature of compassionate acts. In 
these situations, the figures of the deserving refugees are challenged and con- trasted with 
the re-emergence of negative representations to which they are initially opposed. These 
tensions generate moral dilemmas that have both a cognitive and an emotional dimension. 
Volunteers evoke a mismatch between certain expected conducts linked to their initial 
representations of the refugees and the actual behaviours of those who benefit from their 
support. In these cases, volunteers feel they have to make difficult judgement calls about who 
deserves their compassion and who does not. At the same time, they also experience an 
emotional unease (and sometimes distress) as they realise that they could reproduce 
negative stereotypes about ‘underserving migrants’, which would potentially undermine their 
compassionate acts. However, the re-evaluation of these disturbing situations allows the 
volunteers to recompose their action by dampening their potential negative judgements and 
appeasing their emotional distress. 
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The Reaffirmation of Volunteers’ Commitment: Focus on Action and Judgement Avoidance  
In order to sustain their engagement over time, volunteers have to deal with the frustra- tions 
and negative representations generated by these ambiguous experiences, which potentially 
undermine their motivation, commitment and relationship with the benefi- ciaries of their 
activities. In their narratives, we observed three predominant coping strat- egies based on 
both emotional and cognitive labour, characterised by processes of reappraisal of their 
representations of refugees and, at a more general level, of compas- sion as a ‘feeling rule’ 
underpinning their role as volunteers.  
The first strategy is to shift the responsibility to make a judgement about who is wor- thy of 
help (and who is not) to external agencies, such as the charity or the government. For 
instance, the Birmingham-based host mentioned above explained how she finds her- self 
uncomfortable with not knowing the background and story of her guests, in particu- lar 
because this leads her to question their suffering. At the same time, she also stressed that 
she trusts her charity made an informed decision about their needs:  
I suppose what it is, is there’s a trust that I have to have with the charity that the people 
that are coming to me, you know, do need the space, and do need the room. And as 
long as that’s established, and they are happy with that, then it doesn’t, it shouldn’t 
matter to me why they’re there or why they’re not there. And if I can then provide a 
service and be helpful then that’s fine. (Interview 32, woman, 32 years old)  
Other volunteers would invoke the state’s authority (like ‘the blessed Home Office’, Interview 
44, woman, 71 years old, London) in making the judgement about who ‘deserves’ help and 
who does not, regardless of whether they agree with it or not. This type of coping mechanism 
allows the volunteers to focus on the ‘doing’ (‘You’re just there to support the person’, 
Interview 44, woman, 71 years old, London) and to exter- nalise the responsibility of making 
a judgement about the ‘deservingness’ of refugees in ambiguous situations.  
The second mechanism similarly enables volunteers to avoid situations in which they should 
produce a judgement on who deserves their help. However, it is different because it 
emphasises the urgency of the situation. As a volunteer who went to Dunkirk claimed, the 
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focus on the ‘mouths to feed’ alleviates her anxiety about not knowing if her help went to the 
‘wrong people’:  
But we would end up helping people that we thought were maybe traffickers, and not 
nice people at all, and then how do you cope with that, you know, that your efforts go 
maybe to the wrong people? And you just couldn’t, you just couldn’t make that 
distinction, you couldn’t make judgement calls. Just literally there’s a mouth to feed, 
you feed it, full-stop. (Interview 36, woman, 57 years old, Midlands)  
In certain cases, this coping strategy led to a reconversion of volunteering activities. For 
instance, a participant who went through a period of burnout after his first experience in 
Dunkirk, explained how he managed to commit himself again, by avoiding situations where 
he had to ‘help everybody’ in a ‘generalised way’:  
I went back again this year for the re-build, but that was a whole different kind of 
mission because it was very mission-specific [. . .] We weren’t there to try and help 
everybody in any kind of generalised way, we were there specifically to re-build this 
building. [. . .] And I found that a lot easier, because I could emotionally disengage from 
everything else going on, and just pour all my energy into doing the work that we were 
doing on that particular project. (Interview 40, man, 45 years old, Midlands)  
Through this coping mechanism, the volunteers develop a discourse centred on the practice 
of support in order to justify their commitment to volunteering. As this last extract illustrates 
through the idea of ‘emotional disengagement’, focusing on a clear material and physical 
chore helps avoiding the moral dilemmas and negative feelings emerging when volunteers 
are led to assess the suffering and the morality of refugees.  
The judgement of the ‘merit’ of the refugees is also at the core of the third and final coping 
mechanism. In this case, volunteers portray the situation in which refugees find themselves 
as too complex, to the point of not being able to fairly gauge their suffering or morality. One 
of these factors relates to cultural and religious differences. For exam- ple, a host explained 
how she felt uncomfortable towards her guest fasting during Ramadan. She said: ‘I felt as a 
sort wishy-washy liberal because I was thinking “you have to get out and find a job!”’ At the 
same time, she said:  
 14 
But that wasn’t negative. That was interesting to examine. It was interesting to think 
where do I stand on fasting for a month [. . .] it’s about me really, the metropolitan life 
racing around and thinking how ridiculous and then needing to stop and thinking about 
it more carefully. (Interview 12, woman, 52 years old, London)  
In this case, the idea of cultural differences was used to describe the situation as so com- plex 
that she could not clearly establish if her guest truly deserved her support (she defined the 
situation as ‘interesting’, avoiding judging it more clearly).  
Another element raised as a source of complexity is the mental health of refugees, which is 
often presented as being linked to their traumatic past experiences. For instance, a volunteer 
explained that the bedroom she used to host a refugee was partly damaged by her guest, 
therefore raising a dilemma about how to judge the morality of this person. She then argued 
that this was due to what she perceived as mental health issues (men- tioned here and 
discussed more explicitly later in the interview): ‘But increasingly I realise [GUEST NAME] is 
acting at the best of her capacity. That she, she can’t pull her act together much more really’ 
(Interview 30, woman, 48 years old, Birmingham).  
Finally, to condone what are perceived to be reproachable conducts, volunteers also refer to 
the extreme destitution experienced by refugees. For example, a volunteer in Sheffield 
explained her frustration when refugees seemed to be taking advantage of the donations by 
selling them on eBay. She then evoked the idea that the difficult conditions they faced (they 
‘have nothing’) makes the situation too complex for her to make a judgement on their 
‘deservingness’. In fact, she added: ‘Good luck to them because I would do that if I had 
nothing!’ (Interview 15, woman, 62 years old).  
On the whole, we observed that the tensions encountered in the interactions with refu- gees 
lead to foreground the practical aspect of volunteering. Indeed, through these three coping 
mechanisms, participants place action and practical tasks at the core of their engagement and 
in doing so they avoid making judgements: they delegate this responsi- bility to other actors; 
they avoid situations in which they have to make decisions on deservingness; they 
acknowledge their inability to fairly evaluate complex situations. This allows them to deal with 
their own negative emotions and to sustain their engage- ment over time.  
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Compassion in Action: Casting Deservingness Aside?  
Rather than being exceptions, moral dilemmas are constitutive moments in the articula- tion 
of the commitment to refugee support, and more generally humanitarian aid (Armbruster, 
2019; Malkki, 2015; Roth, 2015). We showed that these quandaries pro- duce a stronger focus 
on executing practical tasks and a distancing from the moment of judgement about the 
deservingness of the refugee beneficiaries. As we mentioned above, compassion is an 
‘emotion in operation’ (Berlant, 2004: 4) based on a complex evalua- tion of the sufferer 
(Nussbaum, 1996). As they aim to cope with the moral and emotional dilemmas that emerge 
in the course of their experience in the field, pro-refugee volun- teers become more involved 
in the operational dimension of compassion and tend to avoid evaluative considerations. We 
argue that this shift can lead to change the meaning of compassion in two potentially 
diverging ways. One the one hand, it can buttress ten- dencies in the charity and humanitarian 
sector to disconnect the experience of volunteers from that of the refugees. On the other, it 
can open up new avenues towards more politi- cised forms of compassion, in particular 
through a solidarity framework.  
By centring on the ‘doing’ and by withdrawing from the frustrating interactions with the 
beneficiaries, volunteers risk exacerbating the tendency to create an emotional distance 
between the ‘helpers’ and the ‘helped’, often characterising the humanitarian and charity 
sector (Collovald, 2002). As discussed by Malkki (2015) and Willemez (2002), in many cases 
workers and volunteers in international humanitarian organisa- tions experience emotional 
challenges as a result of their difficult interactions with members of the recipient groups. To 
cope with these situations, they retreat into the volunteers’ group, motivating themselves 
through the effectiveness of their actions, and try to develop an ‘affective neutrality’ (Malkki, 
2015: 68) in their relations with those they aim to support (see also Roth, 2015). These coping 
strategies resonate with those developed by the volunteers we interviewed, for instance 
around the lack of gratitude and the doubts about the genuineness of refugees’ needs. More 
generally, as observed by Armbruster (2019: 2693), volunteers who focus on the execution of 
prac- tical tasks risk becoming a ‘“to-be-managed” group whose contact with refugees [is] 
subject to training and regulation’. By doing so, they might reinforce a view of chari- ties as 
‘agents of professionalism’ (Armbruster, 2019: 2693), that have the power to establish a 
moral economy of vulnerability and independence through which the refu- gees’ worth is 
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assessed. Therefore, they risk leaving unchallenged the role of decision- makers (charities and 
the state more generally) that act as disciplining bodies both towards the volunteer 
population and the refugees (Armbruster, 2019: 2693; see also Fassin, 2010).  
At the same time, our analysis shows that the emphasis placed on the ‘action’ of vol- 
unteering also potentially counters dominant discourses around compassion as pity, since it 
diverts their engagement from the centrality of deservingness. To cope with the frustra- tion 
generated by witnessing unexpected conducts or situations, which might lead to negative 
representations, the volunteers feel that they need to stop asking themselves if the refugees 
are truly suffering, innocent and therefore worthy. ‘Deservingness’ thus appears no longer 
crucial to the sustainment of their engagement. But the volunteers also potentially unhinge 
the current dominant discourse around compassion as pity by de- coupling compassionate 
acts from deservingness. In fact, they acknowledge the possibil- ity that the refugees they are 
helping could be making ‘calculated decisions’ (as one of the hosts suspected), could lie to 
them (as in the case of the woman in Calais) or could exploit other refugees (as in the case of 
smugglers). Nevertheless, they continue to sup- port them. Hoggett (2006: 156) argues that 
compassion, unlike pity, ‘requires patience, tolerance of frustration, the capacity to withstand 
disillusionment’. No longer in the space of purity and innocence of the idealised other, the 
volunteers are faced with ‘the space for culpability, ungratefulness, ugliness and bloody-
mindedness’ where real-life refugees live. While the volunteers we interviewed do not 
explicitly enumerate solidarity among their motivations, the ‘simultaneous identification and 
dis-identification with the suffering of the other’ (Hoggett, 2006: 161) is necessary to start 
relinquishing a senti- mental form of pity and to endorse a kind of compassion more oriented 
towards solidar- ity and social justice (Hoggett, 2006; Nussbaum, 1996; Sznaider, 1998; 
Theodossopoulos, 2016). As the former is exclusively focused on the alleviation of material 
suffering, the latter combines compassion towards suffering with anger at injustice (Kleres, 
2018). Therefore, challenging an objectified and idealised notion of the refugees can help 
decentring the suffering of others and emphasising the (political) root causes of their 
vulnerability (Hoggett, 2006; Whitebrook, 2002).  
 
Conclusion  
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In this article, we have explored the construction of compassion at the individual level of the 
volunteers operating in the refugee support sector in the UK. We have shown that pro- 
refugee volunteers do not completely adhere to mainstream understandings of deserving- 
ness and continually negotiate them in their interaction with the refugees, hence also 
reappraising the compassionate nature of their action. Throughout their engagement, vol- 
unteers are faced with the problematic nature of the idealised representations underpin- ning 
the ‘feeling rule’ of compassion, and therefore they experience moral and emotional 
dilemmas. In order to sustain their engagement over time they develop coping mecha- nisms, 
through which they focus on practical support tasks with no direct involvement in the 
judgement about who deserves their compassion. By doing so, they produce ambigu- ous 
effects with regard to their engagement in refugee support groups. On the one hand, 
volunteers tend to view their role as mere executors of tasks, hence strengthening the 
tendency to detach themselves emotionally from the experience of refugees. At the same 
time, however, they also unsettle the dominant compassionate response to the ‘refugee 
crisis’ by acknowledging the complex and political nature of refugees’ vulnerability. This 
shows how, while compassion definitely shapes volunteers’ responses to the ‘refugee cri- sis’, 
‘feeling rules’ are not fixed nor simply strategically mobilised by movement organis- ers but 
evolve and are constantly negotiated ‘from below’.  
Overall, our analysis has shed light on how notions of deservingness (Chauvin and Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2014) permeate society on the migration issue in ambivalent ways, especially in 
unsettled times (Shiff, 2020). Far from being consensual and stable over time, we have argued 
that deservingness – and the moral judgements it relates to – is constantly negotiated and re-
interpreted not only by state, legal and charity actors (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014; 
Shiff, 2020) but also by the individuals operat- ing in the field. We have shown that the focus 
on how individual actors cope with moral and emotional dilemmas in the course of their 
engagement is crucial for the understand- ing of collective action, during which participants 
re-assess their motivations, their emo- tions and the meaning given to their practices. As 
Eliasoph (2016: 248) maintains, the focus on the ‘puzzles’, ‘paradoxes’ and ‘contradictions’ of 
collective action is a useful way to capture the complex processes of meaning-making among 
actors working with disadvantaged groups (see also Theodossopoulos, 2016). This article has 
illustrated how the meaning given by volunteers to their own engagement in compassionate 
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acts is never fully settled but is continually shaped by unexpected interactions and situations 
that dis- rupt the logics of evaluation about the deservingness of beneficiaries, as well as the 
logic of compassion more generally.  
 
Notes  
1. In this article, we use the term ‘refugee’ but acknowledge that the acts of compassion 
we observe are directed towards distinct legal categories such as asylum seekers, 
undocumented migrants, unaccompanied minors and vulnerable migrants more 
generally.  
2. For exceptions see Darling (2009) and more recently Steinhilper and Karakayali (2018).  
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